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ESSAY
THE THOMAS HEARINGS: WATCHING
OURSELVESt
ROBERT F. NAGEL*
For three days last October millions of Americans watched their
television screens in appalled fascination as the Senate Judiciary Com-
mittee considered Anita Hill's charges against Clarence Thomas. Did
we recognize something about ourselves in those fleeting, disturbing
images? I believe that we saw symbolic confirmation of the common
intuition that there is a newly emerging American self-definition com-
prised of everyday indecency, personalized self-interest, and weak
character. Such a conceptualization is not only dismaying in itself but
also saps confidence in our capacity to cope with virtually all
problems. Hence it is only natural that in the course of ordinary life,
we often attempt to downplay generalized claims about cultural defi-
ciencies. But in the focused, theatrical setting of the televised hear-
ings, grim self-doubt could gain a foothold.
Of course, this unhappy interpretation could have represented a
misleading moment of self-doubt rather than a significant insight.
Ironically, however, it is the Supreme Court, that faithful barometer of
our times, that provides some evidence of the substantiality of the
bleak cultural image that drew us so fitfully to our television sets. De-
cades of constitutional decisions tell us that what we saw of ourselves
in those proceedings must be taken seriously.
OFFENSIVENESS As VIRTUE
Consider, first, the most obvious reason that Anita Hill's charges
riveted us. The words she attributed to Thomas were startlingly
graphic and crude. They would be offensive to many people in many
settings. However, a central principle of the Supreme Court's free
speech decisions is that offensive communications are valuable. The
t A version of this essay was delivered to the El Paso Bar Association on May 4, 1992 as part of
its Law Week observances.
* Ira C. Rothgerber, Jr. Professor of Constitutional Law, University of Colorado. The author
retains the copyright to this essay.
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Court has said that "one man's vulgarity is another's lyric." It has
praised tumult, discord and offensiveness ("verbal cacophony") as a
"sign of strength." In contrast, the Court has repeatedly referred to
impulses toward reflection and self-discipline with forbidding words
like "timidity," "chilling effect," and "self-censorship."
As a consequence, a drawing that depicted a minister as having
had sexual intercourse with his mother in an outhouse is constitution-
ally protected. So is the word "fuck" on bumper stickers. So are con-
certs featuring songs that glamorize sexual brutality. So are
pornographic magazines that contain pictures and words offensive
enough to make the words attributed to Thomas sound, by compari-
son, tamely clinical. This cacophony, we try to convince ourselves, is
desirable; indeed, if the Court is right, it is one of our defining virtues.
How, then, did the American public manage to be shocked by the
sexually explicit conversation described by Professor Hill? The an-
swer is, of course, that while vulgarity is legally protected on public
streets, in commercial theaters, on the radio, in public parks and else-
where, it is not acceptable in the workplace. What is "robust expres-
sion" in most settings is "sexual harassment" at the job site. As a
society, our choice is that it is more important to protect women from
sexual pressure and vulgarity on the job than at the newsstand or
along the street or in the home. Thus the hearings were premised on
an assumption that the workplace implicates uniquely important val-
ues. Simultaneously, however, they caught us up in watching Hill talk
of her own career-which raised to the surface misgivings about
whether careers, as they are now defined, can have much moral signifi-
cance for anyone, male or female.
CAREERISM AND RESPONSIBILITY
Hill testified that, despite Thomas's offensive behavior, she fol-
lowed him from the Education Department to the Equal Opportunity
Commission. Her explanation was partly that Thomas's behavior had
improved and partly that she thought her position at Education was
insecure. This issue was of obvious interest because, to the extent that
her explanations seemed weak, it became more difficult to believe that
Hill could have been mistreated by Thomas. But the issue was also
important in a less obvious way. Even if the explanations seemed be-
lievable, her behavior was disturbing. In casting her professional lot
with Thomas, Hill had decided that her job was more important than
her obligations to the public.
Those obligations were considerable. If Thomas was guilty of
sexual harassment, Hill certainly knew that he should not have been
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appointed to head the agency charged by law with preventing sex dis-
crimination in employment. Nor should he have later become judge
on the United States Court of Appeals. As a lawyer and a public offi-
cial, Hill had a responsibility to citizens at large; as a feeling person
she had an obligation to those women who might work for Thomas
and might suffer in the ways that Hill said she had suffered. As it was,
Hill waited some nine years to make her allegations publicly. Her own
explanation for this delay was that "telling at any point could ad-
versely affect my career." In fact, during those years her career
benefitted more than once from Thomas's position and connections.
If Hill had appeared to be an inept or venal person, this course of
conduct might have seemed somewhat blameworthy but only nar-
rowly significant. However, Hill's decision to testify at the confirma-
tion hearings cast her in a heroic role. Moreover, she impressed her
audience as an intelligent, decent, strong individual. She was well-
educated and successful. Therefore, Hill's prolonged silence could not
be seen as a sign of any special weakness. If such an admirable person
had placed her career ahead of her sense of civic responsibility, what
can be expected of the rest of us? Bravely occupying center stage in a
national drama, Hill paradoxically drove home a discouraging
message about how little selflessness we can expect of one another.
Four other respectable people-Susan Hoerchner, Ellen Wells,
Joel Paul, and John Carr-testified that in years past Hill had pri-
vately confided information about Thomas's alleged misbehavior. All
of these witnesses were lawyers, but not one had pushed her to make
her accusations to the appropriate authorities. Their conversations
with Hill had focused on her feelings and her career. To be sure, these
attorneys had only limited responsibility. The decision to remain si-
lent was Hill's to make and the advantages were hers to enjoy, but the
privatization of concern among four separate, sophisticated lawyers
was striking. It seemed during the hearing as if an entire profession-
indeed, the profession that dominates much of government service and
has almost monopoly control over our system of justice-had lost its
sense of public obligation.
A reduction in the civic aspirations of the legal profession has in
fact occurred. This has not been concealed. It has been woven right
into our constitutional law. As long ago as 1977, the Supreme Court
declared that the advertising of lawyers' fees is protected by the free
speech clause of the First Amendment. After analogizing legal serv-
ices to commercial goods, the Court said that the listener's interest in
commercial advertising "may be far keener than his concern for ur-
gent political dialogue." With commercial purchasing thus elevated to
1992]
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(or, perhaps, above) the level of political decisionmaking, the Court
addressed the possibility that a constitutional right to advertise might
adversely affect lawyers' sense of professionalism. The Justices ac-
knowledged the historic view that law is a form of public service
rather than a commercial trade but dismissed it as an "anachronism."
The sense of diminished professional expectations that Anita Hill
and her four supporting witnesses conveyed to us, then, has been au-
thoritatively present in our culture for many years. The reduction of
law to a trade is important in itself, but it is more significant as a
symptom of a widespread loss of idealism. This deeper loss is espe-
cially evident in our disdain for the politicians that we elect to office.
Recall the scorn directed at the twelve senators who comprised the
Judiciary Committee. We knew that Hill's charges were serious and
relevant, and we knew that these Senators were obliged to hear evi-
dence and to come to some determination. Yet we were angry with
them for doing their jobs. Our resentment did not arise only in reac-
tion to the fecklessness and hypocrisy that eventually characterized
some of the performance of some of the Senators. It began the instant
we saw these politicians sit down to judge the credibility and morality
of Thomas and Hill. It began visually, not substantively, for what an-
gered us was the spectacle-the idea-of politicians presuming to ap-
ply ethical standards.
Distrust of politicians can of course, indicate independence and
vigor among the citizenry, but in recent decades skepticism has grown
into a massive drag on representative government. In 1976, for exam-
ple, the Supreme Court came to the rather astonishing conclusion that
local patronage systems violate the free speech rights of government
employees. The Court emphasized that patronage penalizes political
affiliation and this is true. But the Court's approach, focusing on how
much public employment and political affiliation matter to individuals,
privatized free speech. Speech is not merely a matter of the gratifica-
tions associated with self-expression or economic security. Speech has
public functions which include helping to make government respon-
sive to the people.
Rather than being antithetical to these public purposes of free-
dom of speech, patronage in many respects furthers them. It encour-
ages party affiliation and activity, thus promoting political
participation. It vastly increases the operational control newly elected
officials can have, thus enabling electoral results to be translated into
altered policies. Patronage, in short, is an affront to thoroughgoing
cynicism because as a system it links politics in its most materialistic
form to high public purposes. The Court, however, found this vision
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of politics to be another anachronism, outdated by the Justices' opin-
ion that merit systems can satisfactorily coexist with accountable gov-
ernment. By constitutionalizing civil service the Court opted for a
clean but despairing definition of the work of the politician.
The modern idea that ordinary, crass electoral politics are uncon-
nected to high public functions has lead to far-reaching changes in our
institutions. The famous and acclaimed Watergate tapes case provides
a sobering illustration. This decision, as everyone knows, helped to
drive an elected President from office. Until that dramatic event, it
had been the common assumption that the constitutional remedies for
misconduct in the Oval Office were all political-presidential oversight
or (failing this) impeachment and removal by the Congress, or (failing
this) repudiation by popular ballot. At the time of the Court's deci-
sion, the first of these had failed but the second was underway; an
apparently serious and responsible Committee of the House was inves-
tigating the conduct of President Nixon and his aides. The decision in
United States v. Nixon proved to a relieved nation that this uncertain
and prolonged process could be short-circuited. Corruption at the
presidential level, we discovered, can be exposed and rectified by using
independent grand juries and unelected federal judges.
The discovery of a nonpolitical solution to executive branch
wrong-doing was so delightful that Congress soon set up a kind of
prosecutorial civil service largely under the control of the Judicial
Branch. This solution was fully institutionalized by 1988 when the
Court validated the "Ethics in Government Act," despite a range of
strong constitutional challenges. With this, we Americans had suc-
cessfully neutered some of the most subtle and significant political
judgments imaginable-judgments about when, how far, and at what
cost high executive officials should be investigated and prosecuted. In
determining that these decisions are not fit for elected leaders, we said-
how little we expect of our politicians. We also said how little we
expect of each other.
The devaluation of politicians' work is graphically displayed dur-
ing every judicial confirmation proceeding. The Senate's "advice and
consent" function could ideally provide an opportunity for Americans
to connect their ordinary experiences, values, and perceptions to fun-
damental issues of principle and wisdom. Through our elected repre-
sentatives our felt-interests and aspirations could be communicated to
judicial candidates who will eventually determine the direction of our
fundamental law. How is the right to abortion affecting family life?
Do our public schools still indoctrinate students with religious
precepts? To what extent are religious beliefs now penalized and
1992]
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driven out of our public life? Is affirmative action essential to racial
equality or a threat to the self-respect of minority group members?
Such are the questions raised by the nomination of people like Sandra
Day O'Connor, Robert Bork, Anthony Kennedy, and Clarence
Thomas.
Instead of debating pivotal questions of value and fact, questions
that involve politicians in their high role, members of the Judiciary
Committee pretend they are not senators. Like Justices or law profes-
sors, they talk about penumbras and natural rights, the intent of the
framers, the place of stare decisis. Or, like trial court judges, they try
to conduct trials about individual guilt or innocence. Or, like a civil
service board, they weigh professional qualifications. Any role can be
imagined and played during this period of massive transition on the
federal bench except a role that would invest politics itself with real
stature and significance.
MORALISM AND OPPORTUNISM
Although they conveyed to us how far we have devalued the pub-
lic responsibilities of lawyers, politicians, and citizens, the Thomas
hearings nevertheless had an aura of sticky moralism. Senators
claimed to be appalled by the sexual explicitness in Hill's allegations.
(Senator Simpson referred to "this foul, foul stack of stench.") The
nominee was stem in denouncing invasions of his privacy, and at one
point he condemned the whole process as a "high-tech lynching." The
Chairman was boyishly eager in his efforts to keep the proceedings
"fair."
The combination of political cynicism with personal self-right-
eousness was vividly captured by an exchange that occurred late on
Sunday night during the testimony of John Doggett. A sense of antici-
pation had been building for this witness. Earlier press accounts made
his story sound both excitingly strange and potentially important.
Had Hill fantasized about romantic relationships with men? Had she
displayed inappropriate anger at imagined rejections? As tantalizing
as such questions were, Doggett's testimony turned out to be a dud.
After spending an inordinate amount of time talking about himself,
Doggett told a story that did more to confirm his own egoism than to
discredit Anita Hill. Most observers knew at once that Doggett was
not a crucial witness, but not Senator Howard Metzenbaum.
Metzenbaum thought Doggett worth discrediting. When his mo-
ment to ask questions arrived, the Senator turned immediately toward
his aide to get a damning piece of evidence. He then demanded to
know whether nine years earlier Doggett himself had not sexually
[Vol. 63
THE THOMAS HEARINGS
harassed a young woman. This question and the "evidence" that it
was based on quite appropriately sent Doggett into a fury. The ques-
tion was a smear. It was based on an aide's telephone conversation
with someone who had not testified, had not been sworn, and would
not appear for cross-examination. Worse, as Doggett himself angrily
pointed out, the smear was an unwitting re-enactment of one interpre-
tation of the basic structure of the hearings themselves: If a black
male appears as a political threat to white liberals, locate someone who
will make charges of sexual misconduct. Metzenbaum's reflexive, cas-
ual use of this tactic appeared to confirm the worst suspicions of
Thomas and his allies.
No amount of scurrying by Chairman Biden to shut off Metzen-
baum's line of inquiry could suppress the wider implications of this
play-within-a-play. Senator Metzenbaum's self-assured ideology had
been vividly communicated in this and earlier confirmation hearings.
It was clear that, for him, there could be only one acceptable direction
for the Supreme Court; for him, the judicial role was simply and only
to advance a particular political agenda. The morality of this position
being certain, Senator Metzenbaum felt free-indeed, he felt obliged-
to pursue his ends by all available means. Thus, in the image of this
earnest man we all saw the depressing truth that the genesis of much
of our political immorality is in our simplistic moralism.
Americans are a legalistic people, and we especially revere our
fundamental law. But our own impatience for results is causing us to
doubt that there is security in rules or integrity in processes. If we
want, for example, a right to privacy, that is enough ground for find-
ing it where the constitutional text is silent. We hardly even think of
the amendment process; that procedure, which is workable and au-
thoritative and available, would require something of ourselves.
For decades now we have demanded that the Courts expand, de-
lete, and distort the Constitution, and the judiciary (honored by the
significance of the invitation) has complied. As a result, whole librar-
ies of modern constitutional interpretations can be reduced to this sen-
tence: Anything can be forbidden or permitted if there is sufficiently
good justification. If impeachment seems impractical or uncertain, it
is permissible to substitute the criminal process. If the president seems
unwilling to see that the criminal law is faithfully executed, we can
entrust this executive function to a new hybrid branch of government.
If there is a good reason for the government to regulate the speech of
participants in the electoral process, principles of free speech are not
offended. If there is not a sufficiently good reason for the government
to regulate flag desecration or pornography, principles of free speech
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are offended. If it seems necessary, federal judges can raise taxes, op-
erate public schools, or administer state prison systems. If it seems
unnecessary, newly elected mayors cannot install employees of their
own politician persuasion. All means must be justified, but the end is
always the justification.
As a society, we have demanded so much of law that the idea of
law is in disarray around us, replaced by expediency and desire. In the
end, law requires us to believe in ourselves, in our strength as individu-
als and as a culture. We are fast losing this belief. That is what we
knew as we watched Clarence Thomas's confirmation hearings and
that is why the opportunity for public deliberation about who should
sit on our Supreme Court has become such an eerie spectacle.
